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ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS SO INCONCLUSIVE THAT
IT WAS BASED ON REMOTE AND SPECULATIVE POSSIBILITIES
OF GUILT, REASONABLE MINDS MUST HAVE ENTERTAINED A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE CRIME.

An appellate court will reverse on the basis of insufficiency of
the evidence "when the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently
improbable that ^reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt' that the defendant committed the crime."

State

v.

Goddard,

871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (quotation omitted); accord

State

Warden,

885 P.2d

813 P.2d 1146, 1151 (Utah 1991); State

810, 819 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

v. Strain,

v.

In reviewing an issue concerning

insufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court's function is to
insure that there is "sufficient competent evidence"

regarding each

element of the charge to support a finding that the defendant, beyond
a reasonable doubt,1 committed the crime.

See Warden,

813 P.2d at

1150.

x

5eeUtah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1), providing that "[a] defendant
in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the defendant shall
be acquitted."

3

In its Brief, the State argues that Defendant failed to meet the
marshaling requirement by omitting stipulations of the parties that
were entered into both prior to and during trial

(See Brief of

Appellee, p. 8) . When viewed more closely, however, the stipulations
referred to by the State are basically of a foundational nature and
are substantially repetitive of the list of evidence marshaled by
Defendant on pages fifteen and sixteen of his Brief.
One particular stipulation emphasized by the State in the course
of the foregoing argument is the parties' stipulation that neither
Defendant Murphy nor Defendant "had permission to be in Mason Moving
and Storage on the evening of the 22nd of June." (See R. 85-86, Bench
Trial Transcript).

The State argues that this stipulation, together

with other surrounding circumstances set forth on pages eleven and
twelve of Appellee's Brief, "clearly establish that at least one
person in Murphy's vehicle unlawfully entered Mesa's building that
night."

Such an argument indicates at least some recognition by the

State that while the evidence at trial and the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom
burglary

and

reasonable

show, albeit inconclusively,

theft,

doubt

it

that

fails

to

Defendant

that there was a

conclusively
burglarized

prove

the

beyond

building

a

and

exercised unauthorized control over the vending machine and coin
changer.

By focusing on the superfluous and tangential stipulation

about whether or not Murphy and Defendant had permission to be in the
building, the State attempts to divert attention from the real issue

4

of whether there was sufficient competent evidence on each element to
support Defendant's conviction.
The State gives short shrift to the fact that there is no
physical evidence, whatsoever, connecting Defendant, to the alleged
burglary or theft. At trial, the investigating officer, Officer
Arnold, testified that he found no fingerprints upon checking both
the inside and outside of the door frame or door that allegedly had
been

pried

open

in

the

course

Transcript, R. 83, lines 7-14) .

of

the burglary

(Bench

Trial

Moreover, Officer Arnold did not

check either the vending machine or the coin changer for fingerprints
(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 83, lines 17-21) .

In light of this

complete lack of physical evidence, the failure of any witness to
place Defendant in any location other than as a passenger in Murphy' s
automobile, and the uncontroverted testimony by Murphy that Defendant
neither assisted (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 96-97; R. 110, lines 810) nor knew anything of the crime (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 94-95)
until Murphy explained it to him in the course of the chase from
North Salt Lake to Salt Lake City proper (Bench Trial Transcript, R.
97, lines 14-16, 23-25) , should cause this Court to reach a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Featherson,
The

See

State

v.

781 P.2d 424, 431-32 (Utah 1989).
State argues in its Brief that "Defendant's unlawful

presence in the building is reasonably drawn from the testimony
concerning whether the vending and change machines . . . could be
carried by one person."

{See

Brief of Appellee, p. 12) .
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The

testimony

at

trial

indicates

otherwise.

Officer

Beckstrand's

uncontroverted testimony at trial was that the vending machine and
coin changer could be lifted by oneself (Bench Trial Transcript, R.
70-73; R. 75, lines 7-14) . Even the owner of the units, who, unlike
Mr. Murphy, is not an experienced mover, testified that, while being
very awkward and difficult, it is possible to move the "units" by
yourself (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 89, lines 6-12) . The inference
that Mr. Murphy could and did lift the units by himself and put them
in the back of his car is especially reasonable in light of the
undisputed evidence that Mr. Murphy, at the time of trial, had worked
loading and unloading moving trucks for approximately eleven years
(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 93, lines 11-14).
Defendant acknowledges that the trial court did not believe codefendant Murphy's version of the events.

Further, Defendant

acknowledges that issues of credibility are left to the trier of
fact.

Cf. State

v. Booker,

709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) . However,

credibility issues aside, the evidence in the instant case is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that the trier of
fact must have entertained a reasonable doubt about Defendant's
guilt.2
2

The State assails Defendant's citation of State v. Workman, 852
P.2d 981 (Utah 1993), on the grounds that it does not represent a
plurality opinion by the Utah Supreme Court. By so arguing, the
State fails to recognize that the proposition for which Workman is
cited, i.e., that "a guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is
based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or
speculative possibilities of guilt", is inherently consistent with
the principles set forth in State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah
1991) (quoting State
v. Nickles,
728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1991)).
6

Finally, the State cites State

v. Porter,

705 P.2d 1174, 1177

(Utah 1985), for the proposition that the requisite intent to commit
burglary in the instant case can be inferred from circumstantial
evidence of the manner of entry, the time of day, the character and
contents of the building, the person's actions after entry, the
totality

of

the

explanation.

surrounding

breaking

controverted
Porter,

the

intruder's

According to the Utah Supreme Court's qualifying

language set forth in Porter,
the

circumstances, and

and

such an inference can be made "[w]here

entering

. . . ." Id.

are

clearly

established

and

not

(Emphasis added) . Unlike the defendant in

who was seen by the apartment manager breaking into an

apartment across the hall and who was found by the police in the
course of committing the burglary, see id.

at

1176,

there were no

witnesses in the instant case who placed Defendant in any location
other than the passenger seat of Murphy's car.
and

entering

established
inferred.

at

issue

in

the

and uncontroverted

instant
and

In sum, the breaking

case

therefore

were

not

intent

clearly

cannot be

Furthermore, even if the breaking and entering were

clearly established and uncontroverted, the manner of entry, the time
of day, the character and contents of the building, the person's

Furthermore, the concurring opinion authored by Justice Howe, in
which Justices Hall, C.J., and Zimmerman join, does not specifically
disagree with the aforementioned proposition for which Workman is
cited but instead criticizes an unrelated analysis particular to the
photograph at issue therein.
7

actions after entry,3 the totality of the surrounding circumstances,
and the intruder's explanation all weight heavily in favor of the
evidentiary failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant
had the requisite intent as a principal or as a party to commit the
alleged burglary.
Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary and
theft is viewed is a light most favorable to the trial court's
verdict, it is insufficient to support the conviction inasmuch as the
totality of the circumstances and evidence lead one to formulate a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial
court.

Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is therefore

appropriate in the instant case.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this
Court reverse his convictions of burglary and theft and remand for a
new

trial or further proceedings consistent with this Court's

instructions as stated in its opinion.

3

The State cites State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983),
for the proposition that flight after commission of a crime may be
considered by the fact finder in deciding the question of guilt or
innocence. However, the State fails to mention that while such a
matter may be appropriately considered by the trier of fact, it
should be cautioned and tempered by considerations "that there may be
reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence and that even if
consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged."
Id.
8

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant
issues in the instant appeal dealing with sufficiency of evidence
issues and the level of evidence required for burglary and theft
convictions.

Such matters are of continuing public interest and,

in

light of the facts presented by the instant appeal, involve issues
requiring further development in the area of criminal law case
development for the benefit of bar and public. Counsel for Defendant
further requests that the method of disposition of the instant appeal
be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official Publication" for
purposes of precedential value and direction in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of October, 1997.
,D & WIGGINS, P.C.

fins
Attorney&Hfer Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to
be mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to the following, on this 29th
day of October, 1997.
MR. NORMAN E. PLATE
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL APPEALS DIVISION
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake/CTtv* UT 84114-0854

10

ADDENDUM
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a) (11).
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